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Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is investing in marine scientific research on a massive
scale. This investment supports an oceanographic research agenda that is increasingly global in
scope. One key indicator of this trend is the expanding operations of China’s oceanographic research
fleet. On any given day, 5-10 Chinese “scientific research vessels” (科学考查船) may be found
operating beyond Chinese jurisdictional waters, in strategically-important areas of the Indo-Pacific.
Overshadowed by the dramatic growth in China’s naval footprint, their presence largely goes
unnoticed. Yet the activities of these ships and the scientists and engineers they embark have major
implications for U.S. national security.
This report explores some of these implications. It seeks to answer basic questions about the out-ofarea—or “distant-ocean” (远洋)—operations of China’s oceanographic research fleet. Who is
organizing and conducting these operations? Where are they taking place? What do they entail?
What are the national drivers animating investment in these activities?
It comprises five parts. Part one defines the fleet, and the organizations that own and operate it. Part
two examines primary operating areas. Part three describes the range of activities conducted by
Chinese research vessels while operating in distant-ocean areas. Part four sketches the key strategic

purposes driving state investment in out-of-area oceanography. Part five discusses the implications of
Chinese oceanographic research for U.S. national security.
Fleet Composition
Several different Chinese agencies, research institutes, and universities own and operate
oceanographic research vessels. Until 2018, the State Oceanic Administration owned by far the most
ships, including the large Xiang Yang Hong series of vessels. In March 2018, China’s National
People’s Congress passed legislation to dissolve the State Oceanic Administration, placing its
functions under the new Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR).2 Within the MNR, several institutes
conduct out-of-area research. Chief among them are the First, Second, and Third Institutes of
Oceanography. They own their own vessels and often embark their scientists aboard ships operated
by other groups. MNR oversees the Polar Institute of China, owner of the 20,000-ton Snow Dragon
polar research vessel. Each of the MNR’s regional bureaus—North, East, and South—also own and
operate ships capable of out-of-area research operations.
MNR vessels constitute the bulk of China’s National Marine Research Fleet. The National Fleet was
set up in 2012 in order to improve coordination between ship owners and foster information sharing.
This was an apparent attempt to emulate the University-National Oceanographic Laboratory System
(UNOLS), which coordinates civilian use of oceanographic research vessels in the United States.3 A
Coordination Commission formulates policy guiding use of the National Fleet.4 A government
official heads the Commission. Decisions made by the Commission are implemented by its office,
located within the MNR’s Department of Science and Technology.5
Several other organizations own ships that belong to the National Fleet. Two are major players in
distant-ocean operations: the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and China Ocean Mineral
Resources R & D Association (COMRA). CAS owns a handful of research vessels, including the
Shiyan 3, which in early 2018 surveyed Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the Kexue, a
frequent visitor to the Philippine Sea.6 CAS oversees several important oceanographic research
institutes: the Institute of Oceanology, the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, and the Institute
of Acoustics, all of which own their own vessels and/or embark scientists aboard vessels owned by
other groups. COMRA is a quasi-governmental entity set up in the 1990s to promote China’s
exploration of sea bed resources in high seas areas.7 It owns one major distant-ocean research vessel:
the 5,600-ton, Soviet-built Dayang 1. Several Chinese universities also own ships belonging to the
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National Fleet. Table 1 list major units of the National Fleet that conduct distant-ocean cruises.
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows three key members of the National Fleet.
Table 1. China’s National Marine Research Fleet (Distant-Ocean Vessels)8
Owner
Ministry of
Natural
Resources
(Former State
Oceanic
Administration)

Chinese
Academy of
Science (CAS)

China Ocean
Minerals R & D
Association
(COMRA)
Dalian Maritime
University
Ocean University
of China
Xiamen
University

Ship Name
Snow Dragon

Built
1993

Home Port
Shanghai

Tons
21,000t

Xiang Yang Hong 01

2016

Qingdao

5,000t

Xiang Yang Hong 03

2016

Xiamen

5,200t

Xiang Yang Hong 06

1995

Qingdao

4,900t

Xiang Yang Hong 09

1978

Qingdao

4,400t

Xiang Yang Hong 10

2014

Wenzhou

4,600t

Xiang Yang Hong 14

1981

Guangzhou

4,400t

Xiang Yang Hong 18

2015

Qingdao

2,400t

Xiang Yang Hong 19

2011

Shanghai

4,000t

Xiang Yang Hong 20

1969

Shanghai

3,090t

Haice 3301

2005

Guangzhou

4,000t

Kexue

2012

Qingdao

5,000t

Shiyan 01

2009

Guangzhou

2,500t

Shiyan 03

1981

Guangzhou

3,300t

Dayang 1

1984

Qingdao

5,600t

Yukun

2008

Dalian

5,900t

N/A

Dong Fang Hong 2

1995

Qingdao

3,500t

N/A

Jiageng

2017

Xiamen

3,700t

N/A
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Notes
Owned by the Polar Research
Institute.
Owned by the First Institute of
Oceanography.
Owned by the Third Institute of
Oceanography.
Owned by the MNR North Sea
Branch
Owned by the MNR North Sea
Branch. Mother ship of the Jiaolong
deep-sea submersible.
Owned by the Second Institute of
Oceanography.
Owned by the MNR South Sea
Branch.
Owned by the First Institute of
Oceanography.
Owned by the MNR East Sea
Branch. Former China Marine
Surveillance 50.
Owned by the MNR East Sea
Branch.
Owned by the MNR South Sea
Branch. Former China Marine
Surveillance 83.
Owned by the CAS Ocean Research
Institute.
SWATH hull design. Owned by the
South China Sea Institute of
Oceanology.
Owned by the South China Sea
Institute of Oceanology
Former Soviet survey ship.
Purchased from Russia in 1994.
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The MNR also oversees the China Geological Survey. Its vessels are active in distant-ocean areas,
though they do not belong to the National Fleet. The China Geological Survey administers the
Guangzhou Marine Geological Survey, owner of several research vessels. Its activities primarily
focus on exploration of seabed resources in Chinese-claimed areas, especially the South China Sea.
However, several of its ships—including the Haiyang 4 and Haiyang 6—routinely operate beyond
the First Island Chain.9 Another China Geological Survey affiliate, the Qingdao Institute of Marine
Geology, owns the 4,350-ton Haiyang Dizhi 9, which was commissioned in late 2017.
Table 2. The China Geological Survey Fleet (Distant-Ocean Vessels)
Owner

Ship Name

Built

Home Port

Tons

Guangzhou Marine Geological
Survey

Haiyang 4

1980

Guangzhou

3,300t

Haiyang 6

2009

Guangzhou

4,600t

Haiyang Dizhi 8

2017

Guangzhou

6,900t

Haiyang Dizhi 10

2017

Guangzhou

3,400t

Haiyang Dizhi 9

2017

Qingdao

4,350t

Qingdao Institute of Marine Geology

Primary Operating Areas
For decades, China’s oceanographic research activities were almost entirely concentrated within the
First Island Chain, in waters often referred to as the “near seas” (近海). These activities were largely
driven by military and sovereignty objectives.10 In the 1980s, China’s civilian research fleet surveyed
remote sections of the South China Sea, laying the foundation for China’s ultimate occupation of
seven land features in the Spratly Islands.11 Beginning in 2002, civilian experts led by the Second
Institute of Oceanography conducted surveys of the East China Sea, collecting data needed to
buttress China’s claim to seabed resources out to the Okinawa Trough—a claim that Japan rejects.12
In September 2003, the State Council approved Project 908, a comprehensive survey and assessment
of all Chinese-claimed maritime space in the near seas. It took over 30,000 scientists and technicians
more than eight years to complete.13
Chinese research vessels have operated beyond the First Island Chain since the 1970s. However, the
current scale of activities is without precedent in Chinese history. A review of China’s oceanographic
research activities in October 2017 illustrates the scale and geography of Beijing’s ambitions.
According to publicly available data, eleven research vessels operated out-of-area in that month:14
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In early October, Xiang Yang Hong 18 conducted survey operations just north of
Okinotorishima, a Japanese coral feature in the Philippine Sea.



In early October, polar research ship Snow Dragon completed an 83-day Arctic cruise. It
transited Japan’s Tsugaru Strait on October 4th, arriving in Shanghai four days later.15



The first day of October saw the Dong Fang Hong 2 steaming south of Japan’s Kyushu
Island, part of a lengthy cruise that would take it from the high seas of the North Pacific to
Micronesia’s EEZ.



In first half of October, Xiang Yang Hong 10 operated in Micronesia’s EEZ and the U.S. EEZ
southwest of Guam.



In mid-October, COMRA’s Dayang 1 appeared west of Guam, remaining in the Philippine
Sea for two weeks, arriving at its home port of Qingdao on November 1st.



The Guangzhou Marine Geological Survey ship Haiyang 6 spent the first half of October
operating in the high seas north of Micronesia, in waters where China maintains contract
rights with the International Seabed Authority to explore for cobalt rich ferromanganese
crusts.



In the first half of October, and perhaps without precedent, a China Coast Guard cutter
(1307) escorted Xiang Yang Hong 09—the mother ship of the deep-sea submersible
Jiaolong—as it operated in an area west of the Marianas Islands. From October 14-16, the
pair sailed to a position southwest of Guam, within the U.S. EEZ, presumably for diving
operations in the Mariana Trench.



In October, Xiang Yang Hong 03 and Xiang Yang Hong 06 conducted separate surveys of the
Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone, an area southeast of Hawaii where China and several other
states possess mineral contract rights under the auspices of the International Seabed
Authority.



In the second half of October, CAS research vessel Kexue operated in the Philippine Sea,
including within the EEZs of Palau and Indonesia.



Xiang Yang Hong 01 spent October operating in the South Atlantic, the third leg of its
circumnavigation of the globe.16
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Figure 2 shows a map of Chinese operations in the Western Pacific in October 2017.
The bulk of China’s out-of-area research activities occur in the strategically important waters
between the First and Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific (See Figure 3).17 Some take place
in the large section of high seas in the Philippine Sea, where Chinese vessels can conduct marine
scientific research without permission from any coastal state. Chinese ships also commonly operate
in the huge EEZ of the Federated States of Micronesia and in the EEZ of the U.S. territory of Guam.
The International Seabed Authority has granted China rights to explore for seabed minerals in four
contract zones: two southeast of Hawaii, one east of Guam, and one southeast of Madagascar (see
Figure 4). Much activity observed in distant-ocean areas involves journeys to, from, and within these
contract zones. The Snow Dragon also regularly operates in the polar regions.18
Types of Research Activities
What do China’s oceanographic research vessels do at sea? Many of these ships, especially those
commissioned since 2012, are “comprehensive research vessels,” meaning they can perform a wide
range of research activities, and often do on any given cruise. They principally serve as platforms for
instruments, sensors and other equipment used to collect oceanic and atmospheric data.
Some sensors are attached to the ship. Many vessels, for instance, have “science masts” in the bow
for collecting meteorological data. All have acoustic and other sensors affixed to the hull; the newest
ships, like the Kexue, are fitted with “gondolas”—retractable structures on the bottom of the ship that
prevent bubbles from skewing measurements.19 Acoustic Doppler Current Profilers (ADCPs) direct
sound waves into the water column; returning echoes provide information on the direction and speed
of undersea currents. Multi-beam echo sounders use pulses of sound to obtain precise measurements
of ocean depth. This data can then be used to determine the contours, or bathymetry, of the seabed.
Ships engaged in bathymetric surveys operate in a characteristic “lawn-mower” pattern.
Some sensor are towed behind the ship. The CAS research vessel Shiyan 1, for instance, has a twinhull (SWATH) design, ensuring better stability while towing its acoustic array. Several of these
vessels can tow streamers used for seismic surveys. They direct sound waves into the seabed, with
the strength and pattern of returning echoes used to determine the geologic composition of the
subsoil, including potential oil and gas deposits.
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Other equipment is lowered into the sea from stationary ships. The CTD rosette, for example,
collects information on the temperature and salinity of the water column at various depths. Since
these factors are associated with many undersea processes, they are key variables in much
oceanographic research.
Chinese research vessels deploy surface and subsurface buoys, which are equipped with instruments
that record environmental data, transmitting it back to China via satellite communications, or storing
it for later recovery and analysis.20 Chinese scientists have deployed indigenously-designed “White
Dragon” surface buoys in the Philippine Sea and Indian Ocean. These units are capable of collecting
and transmitting meteorological and oceanographic information in real-time.21 In 2017, Chinese
researchers moored a subsurface buoy in the northwest section of Micronesia’s EEZ (in the
Challenger Deep trough). This buoy—developed by a team of scientists from Northwest Polytechnic
University, China Ocean University, the CAS Institute of Acoustics, and the First Institute of
Oceanography—is equipped with hydrophones used to study deep-sea sound propagation.22
China’s oceanographic research vessels also host various types of underwater vehicles. The Xiang
Yang Hong 09, for example, deploys the Jiaolong deep-sea submersible, capable of taking Chinese
scientists to the some of the deepest locations in the ocean. Other vehicles are unmanned. These
include remotely-operated vehicles (ROVs) such as the Sea Horse and autonomous underwater
vehicles (AUVs) such as the Qianlong 1, 2, and 3, which are equipped with sensors and cameras to
explore for seabed resources. China’s research vessels also now deploy underwater gliders such as
the Sea Wing. Because of their endurance and economy, gliders make excellent platforms for
measuring basic characteristics of the undersea environment, such as temperature and salinity. In
August-September 2017, Xiang Yang Hong 03 launched two Sea Wing gliders in high seas areas
southeast of Hawaii.23 Chinese scientists have also deployed the Sea Wing in the Philippines EEZ, off
the country’s east coast (see Figure 5).
China’s out-of-area research vessels serve as platforms for the research and development of new
marine equipment and instruments. For example, engineers from a laboratory jointly founded by the
Xi'an Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics and the Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine
Science and Technology conducted extensive testing of underwater optics technologies during a
2017 cruise to the Mariana Trench.24 The CAS Shenyang Institute of Automation routinely sends
engineers and scientists aboard research vessels heading to distant-ocean areas to test underwater
vehicles. For example, the Institute embarked several personnel aboard the Dayang 1, which left
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Qingdao on March 20, 2018, to test the Institute’s new Qianlong 3 AUV in the South China Sea and
Western Pacific.25
Figure 6 shows the range of research activities conducted by China’s distant-ocean research fleet.
Strategic Purposes
China’s deployment of oceanographic research ships and related platforms in distant-ocean areas is
part of a massive program to collect oceanic data. What is the ultimate purpose of this collection
effort? Several interests drive the Chinese government’s investment in out-of-area oceanographic
research.26 Two of the main drivers have the greatest significance for U.S. national security. These
include a desire to 1) explore, and ultimately exploit, seabed resources in high seas areas and 2)
support the development of China’s blue-water naval capabilities. While not a major driver, Chinese
oceanographers also serve political functions for the Chinese party-state: as ambassadors of good
will, and tools with which to assert China’s maritime rights and interests.
Seabed Resources
Interest in seabed resources is a big—perhaps the biggest—driver behind China’s distant-ocean
survey operations.27 PRC leaders regard international seabed areas as a potential source of minerals
to support China’s future economic development. This logic was summarized by State Oceanic
Administration Director Liu Cigui in remarks to China’s representative to the International Seabed
Authority in late 2013. Liu told Ambassador Dong Xiaojun, “China possesses a long coastline, vast
maritime space, and rich marine resources. But per capita endowments are low. To ensure the
sustainable development of our economy, we must continue to expand our maritime development
space. We must focus on the 250 million km2 of high seas. For the sake of future generations, we
must vie for more marine resources and maritime rights.”28 As this passage suggests, Chinese
discourse often regards seabed resource exploration and exploitation as a competition between states.
Much of China’s activities are driven by a desire to be the first country to commercially exploit
international seabed resources, and lead the industry.29
Marine science is closely entwined with the PRC’s strategic objective of transforming China into a
“maritime power” (海洋强国), which is largely an economic concept. This aim, first articulated in a
2003 planning document, was famously emphasized in Hu Jintao’s 18th Party Congress Work Report
(November 2012).30 Hu outlined the four key components of China’s maritime power strategy:

China Maritime Report No. 3

8

marine resources, the ocean economy, marine environmental protection, and maritime rights and
interests.31
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has personally expressed his commitment to explore and exploit seabed
resources in high seas areas. At a July 2013 Politburo meeting about China’s maritime power
strategy, Xi declared that China must “thoroughly perform ocean and polar scientific survey work,
perform deep-sea and distant-ocean survey research, expand international cooperation in marine
science and technology, and make preliminary preparations for exploiting ocean and polar
resources.”32 In a May 2016 speech at a national convention on scientific and technological
innovation, Xi again singled out the importance of deep-sea resources: “The deep sea contains
earthly treasures that aren’t remotely understood or developed. But if we want to obtain these
treasures, then we must master key technologies for entering the deep sea, surveying the deep sea,
and developing the deep sea.”33
The PRC is engaged in a whole-of-government effort to pursue commercial exploitation of seabed
resources in high seas areas.34 China currently possesses contract rights under the auspices of the
International Seabed Authority to explore for seabed resources in four separate zones. 35 Quasigovernmental agency COMRA represented China in the first three contracts. The most recent
contract, signed in May 2017, was concluded by China Minmetals Corporation, a mining company.36
In February 2016, China passed the PRC Law on Exploration and Development of Resources in
Deep Sea Seabed Areas, aimed at laying the institutional foundation for the country’s move from
seabed resource exploration to resource exploitation.37
Table 3. Chinese Contracts to Explore for Seabed Resources in High Seas Areas
#

Contract
Period

PRC Contract Party Location of Contract
Zone

Resource Type

1

2001-2016,
2016-2021
(renewed)

COMRA

Clarion Clipperton
Fracture Zone

Polymetallic nodules

2

2011-2026

COMRA

Southwest Indian Ridge

Polymetallic sulphides

3

2014-2029

COMRA

Western Pacific Ocean

Cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts

4

2017-2032

China Minmetals

Clarion Clipperton
Fracture Zone

Polymetallic nodules
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China’s oceanographic research fleet serves on the front lines in this effort. Vessels conduct highresolution bathymetric surveys of high seas areas with potential deposits of seabed minerals, using
shipboard multi-beam echo sounders and new-generation UUVs for this purpose. In July 2018, for
instance, Xiang Yang Hong 10 completed a 250-day cruise to the Indian Ocean, during which it
surveyed part of COMRA’s 10,000 km2 contract zone in the Southwest Indian Ocean. The crew
deployed the UAV Qianlong 2, which conducted nine dives for a total of 257 hours.38 Data collected
during these types of surveys inform Chinese decisions about where to apply for future contract
rights, and which sections of existing contract zones merit additional focus. Aside from exploring for
seabed resources, Chinese research vessels also perform biologic surveys of areas contract zones, as
required under International Seabed Authority rules.
Naval Strategy39
During the command of Admiral Wu Shengli (2006-2017), the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) dramatically expanded the content and geographic scope of its operations. No longer fixated
on preparing for and deterring war, the service came to embrace the diverse set of non-combat
missions for which navies are uniquely suited.40 Many of these operations took place in waters
beyond the First Island Chain, in what Chinese strategists call the “far seas” (远海).41 In 2008, the
PLAN sent its first task force to the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, a
watershed moment which, less than ten years later, resulted in the opening of China’s first overseas
base (in Djibouti).42 Beijing has used the PLAN in other non-combat roles, such as assisting
international efforts to dispose of Syria’s chemical weapons (2014), searching for missing Malaysian
airlines flight 370 in the Indian Ocean (2014), evacuating Chinese citizens from Yemen (2015),
holding joint exercises with Russia and other countries, and making countless port visits throughout
the Indo-Pacific.
The PLAN’s interest in the far seas is not confined to non-combat operations. During Admiral Wu’s
tenure, it also started conducting deployments and training to prepare the service to fight in the far
seas.43 Many conflict scenarios in East Asia could lead to hostilities between China the United States.
The U.S. Navy’s long-range precision strike capabilities, amply demonstrated during the conflicts of
the 1990s, have created a strong impetus for the PLAN to develop the ability to engage U.S. forces
beyond the First Island Chain—well before they arrive in theater.44 As a result, the ocean space
between the First and Second Island Chains has assumed great importance for Chinese naval
strategy.
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The geographic expansion of Chinese naval operations has created intense demands to speed mastery
of the “ocean battlespace environment” (海战场环境) in new ocean areas. Some of these demands
are met by the PLAN itself. The Chinese Navy, like the U.S. Navy, possesses a corps of
meteorologists and oceanographers that support the fleet. The PLAN operates a number of Type
636/636A distant-ocean survey ships, analogues of the U.S. Navy’s Pathfinder class hydrographic
survey ships. These ships perform bathymetric surveys and collect oceanographic and meteorological
data, which serve as inputs for the production of charts and the development and improvement of
forecasting systems. Indeed, the PLAN’s distant-ocean survey fleet has more than tripled since 2015.
Table 4 lists key elements of this fleet. Figure 7 shows PLAN distant-ocean survey ship Haiyang 25.
Table 4. The PLAN’s Distant-Ocean Survey Fleet45
Hull Number

Name

Built

Haiyang 20.

Zhu Kezhen

2003

Haiyang 22

Qian Sanqiang

2008

Haiyang 23.

Qian Xuesen

2015

Haiyang 24.

Deng Jiaxian

2016

Haiyang 25.

Qian Weizhang

2016

Haiyang 26

Chen Jingrun

2016

Haiyang 27

Wang Ganchang

2017

Haiyang 28

Zhu Guangya

2017

Haiyang 29.

Mao Yisheng

2018

Oceanographers at civilian agencies and research institutes support the PLAN in a number of ways.
They share information, such as bathymetric data needed in the creation of charts. When the PLAN
began to routinize far seas operations, its knowledge of ocean areas beyond the First Island China
was extremely limited.46 To remedy this problem, the PLAN sought to leverage the data and
expertise resident in the Ministry of Land and Resources (predecessor of the current MNR). In
January 2009, the two signed the Agreement between the Ministry of Land and Resources and the
People’s Liberation Army Navy on Strengthening Geologic Surveying and Marine Mapping.47
Civilian oceanographers also support the PLAN through their efforts to model oceanic processes.
Especially important are the dynamic elements of the ocean battlespace environment, such as surface
and subsurface currents, tides, and surface and subsurface waves. These and related factors—such as
ocean temperature, density, and salinity—directly affect all manner of naval operations, from basic
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navigation to amphibious landings. Militaries that are more aware of current conditions and better
able to predict future conditions have an advantage over their adversaries. In the words of one PLAN
analyst, “the side with fuller, more accurate, and timelier mastery of the ocean battlespace
environment will have the initiative on the battlefield.”48 Civilian oceanographers develop models for
understanding oceanic phenomena. These models can then be applied to the development of combat
systems and tactics needed by the fleet.
The study of the dynamic ocean is especially important for undersea warfare. Temperature is a key
factor affecting underwater sound propagation. The ability to know and predict the location of
currents, eddies, and other oceanic phenomena confers an advantage to submarine commanders
seeking to elude detection.49 To maximize the performance of sonar and other systems used to detect
foreign submarines, navies must develop accurate oceanographic models for all of the ocean areas
where they intend to operate.
Chinese oceanographers are heavily funded to conduct research on the physical oceanography of the
Philippine Sea. Their work helps the PLAN master the ocean battlespace environment in this
strategically-vital ocean space. The Qingdao National Lab—in conjunction with the MNR and
CAS—is leading an enormous project to build an integrated network of fixed and mobile sensors to
monitor the undersea conditions in the Western Pacific, South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The
evocatively-named “Transparent Ocean Project” is intended to achieve the ability to conduct largescale, real-time ocean observation. Project scientists are developing models for understanding—and
ultimately predicting—the dynamic undersea environment. Project funders and participants openly
acknowledge the security objectives driving their scientific work.50 Though the network is still being
developed, existing infrastructure is already serving the oceanographic needs of the PLAN. Data
collected from sea-based sensors is shared with the MNR’s National Marine Environment
Forecasting Center, which in turn supplies oceanographic and meteorological products to the
PLAN.51
Like the Qingdao National Lab, the MNR conducts research to support China’s naval development.
The First Institute of Oceanography describes its mission as “promoting progress in marine science
and technology to serve management of the marine environment and marine resources, maritime
national security, and marine economic development” (emphasis added).52 When Xiang Yang Hong
01 was commissioned in 2016, authoritative sources stated that its various tasks would include
“comprehensive observation in the field of military oceanography.”53 The Third Institute of

China Maritime Report No. 3

12

Oceanography likewise performs “military oceanography” and “projects for national defense
construction.”54 Research conducted by MNR entities is likely coordinated and shared with the
PLAN by means of mechanisms set up in 2009. In January of that year, the State Oceanic
Administration signed a major cooperative agreement with the PLAN, including provisions for
cooperation in marine science.55 The relationship between the two deepened as a result of a second
cooperative agreement signed in April 2017, intended to “further promote civil-military integrated
development in the maritime realm, and support the construction of a world-class navy.”56
Given the significant degree of civil-military integration in marine science, at least some Chinese
distant-ocean cruises involve activities more akin to “military surveys.” 57 That is, embarked scientists
are collecting data primarily intended to serve military aims, not “in order to increase scientific
knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind,” as marine scientific research is
defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.58 China’s close civil-military
integration differs markedly from the U.S. approach of clearly distinguishing between military
surveys—which are only conducted by U.S. Navy special mission ships—and marine scientific
research, done by civilian academics aboard civilian-operated vessels.
Despite these known ties between the PLAN and civilian research institutes, civil-military integration
in marine science is far from perfect. Synergy is the ideal, not necessarily the reality. Chinese experts
in positions of authority candidly acknowledge shortcomings. For example, at the March 2018
legislative sessions in Beijing, State Oceanic Administration official Zhang Haiwen suggested a
degree of disappointment with achievements to date: “In recent years, there has been lots of
cooperation between the military and civilians, but in the marine field there are many more aspects of
civil-military integration that can be further developed, such as information sharing and ocean
monitoring, among others.59 Still, Chinese leaders recognize the problems and are taking steps to
remedy them. The April 2017 cooperative agreement (discussed above) was a step in that direction.60
Maritime Diplomacy
China’s distant-ocean survey activities serve political functions. Chinese leaders employ research
platforms as tools of maritime diplomacy, both cooperative and competitive. Out-of-area marine
scientific research helps protect the PRC’s maritime rights and interests. According to a 2017 article
published under the byline of the State Oceanic Administration Party Committee, “China not only
possesses sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over three million square kilometers of
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claimed jurisdictional maritime space. It also has extensive and broad maritime rights and interests in
the polar regions, deep-sea areas, and other ocean areas.” 61 Chinese policymakers believe that
maintaining a claim to these rights requires research activities to assert them. In March 2013,
Haiyang 6 departed Guangzhou for a cruise to the eastern Pacific, presumably the Clarion-Clipperton
Fracture Zone, to conduct resource, environmental, and biological surveys. An article published in a
State Oceanic Administration periodical declared that the overarching purpose of the mission was to
“safeguard China’s mineral resource rights and interests in international seabed areas.” 62 Guided by
this mode of thinking, Chinese leaders could sanction, or perhaps even direct, the operations of
oceanographic research vessels to challenge the excessive claims of other coastal states. The October
2017 operations of the Xiang Yang Hong 18 near Japan’s Okinotorishima (cited above) may have in
part been motivated by such political considerations.
China’s research fleet is also used as a tool of cooperative diplomacy. This function likely gained
new impetus from the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Beijing’s ambitious initiative to bolster
political and economic ties between China and countries rimming the Indian Ocean. In June 2017,
China issued the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, which
highlights cooperation in marine scientific research between China and countries along the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road.63
When abroad, vessels must periodically stop in foreign ports to take on fuel and provisions, make
repairs, and swap out crew members. At these times, the vessels often host foreigner visitors,
especially foreign scientists and civilian administrators. For example, from 18-22 April 2016 the
CAS South China Sea Institute of Oceanology vessel Shiyan 1 docked in Colombo, Sri Lanka for
replenishment after completing the first half of a cruise in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. While
in Colombo, faculty, students, and administrators from the University of Ruhuna were invited to tour
the ship.64
Sometimes Chinese research vessels are tasked to help other countries survey their own jurisdictional
waters. For example, the Second Institute of Oceanography has signed a number of agreements with
Indian Ocean countries to help them survey their continental shelves. In June 2016, scientists aboard
Xiang Yang Hong 10 conducted seismic and bathymetric surveys of the continental shelves of
Mozambique and Seychelles. Lead scientist, Tang Yong, said that this cruise would enable China to
“accumulate precious experience for engaging in international cooperation in the field of marine
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surveys and lay a foundation for deepening China-Africa cooperation in the field of marine science
and technology.”65
Aside from providing intangible political benefits, cooperation in marine science ensures Chinese
access to strategically-important ocean areas within other states’ EEZs.66 The Qingdao National Lab,
for instance, has conducted joint research with the Maldives Bureau of Meteorology on the physical
oceanography of waters adjacent to the Maldives. They performed two cruises, one from OctoberNovember 2015 and the second in September 2017, during which they observed ocean temperature,
salinity, and currents using shipboard instruments. They also jointly deployed at least one subsurface
mooring.67
Implications
China’s out-of-area oceanographic research activities raise a number of concerns for U.S.
policymakers. The scale of Beijing’s investment in these operations now dwarfs that of any other
country, including the United States. When it was set up in 2012, the National Fleet comprised just
19 vessels.68 By the end of 2017, it had expanded to 50 ships, half classed as distant-ocean capable.69
This number does not include the five large hulls owned by the China Geologic Survey. The fleet
continues to expand. As of September 2017, ten other oceanographic research vessels were in various
stages of design and construction.70 The Chinese government is also funding development of a
catalog of other research platforms, including manned submersibles, AUVs, and surface and
subsurface moorings. China’s expanding investment contrasts markedly with declining government
support for marine science in the U.S.71 America’s UNOLS fleet possesses only nine large ships,
over half of which were commissioned more than twenty years ago. 72
Marine science is a key pillar of U.S. naval power. In their quest for truth, civilian oceanographers
create knowledge that can be translated into new systems, platforms, and tactics used by the fleet.
They are a source of ideas and insights that can help solve problems facing the military, both in
wartime and peacetime.73 They also educate the men and women who serve the military, as active
duty meteorologists and oceanographers, U.S. Navy scientists, and researchers in private industry.
America’s comparative neglect of marine science risks ceding the great discoveries of the future to a
strategic competitor, and weakening the U.S. oceanographic community just when it is most needed.
China is also pursuing a far more robust degree of civil-military integration than currently exists in
the U.S. Beijing has mobilized civilian scientists to directly serve military aims. The State Oceanic

China Maritime Report No. 3

15

Administration—now the Ministry of Natural Resources—is the biggest player in Chinese distantocean research. Since 2009, it has worked closely with the PLAN to help lay the foundation for the
PLAN’s transformation into an oceanic navy. The Chinese Academy of Science and the Qingdao
National Lab also conduct research on behalf of the PLAN. Beijing’s approach to civil-military
integration in marine science makes it difficult for the U.S. to fully appreciate the naval significance
of Chinese collection operations.74
While the quantity of China’s distant-ocean research is unsurpassed, the quality of marine science in
the PRC still trails that of the U.S. In a February 2018 interview, renowned acoustician Yang Desen
from the Harbin Engineering University lamented China’s comparative lack of basic research,
paucity of basic data, and shortfall of well-trained scientists.75 PLAN scientist Da Lianglong
expressed similar views in March 2018. China’s basic marine research remains derivative: Chinese
scientists still tend to “follow and imitate others.” Truly innovative research is rare, and a gap
remains between China and the world’s maritime powers.76 However, given all that China has
achieved in the last fifteen years, U.S. policymakers would be foolish to assume Beijing cannot
overcome these challenges.
China’s distant-ocean survey activities may be a leading indicator of China’s evolving naval strategy.
They portend a future in which PLAN warships and submarines routinely operate on all the world’s
great oceans. This is true not just because Chinese research ships are laying the scientific foundation
for naval operations in new areas. They are also preparing for future activities to exploit seabed
resources, which the Chinese Navy will be asked to protect. Indeed, international maritime space
constitutes one of the new frontiers in Chinese national security thinking. The 2015 Science of
Military Strategy—an authoritative volume published by China’s National Defense University—
highlights “military struggle in the deep sea.” The authors identify China’s “international sea bed
resource extraction interests” as a key source of future insecurity. 77 The July 2015 revision to China’s
National Security Law added new text about the need to “safeguard the security of our nation’s
activities, assets, and other interests in…international seabed areas.”78 China possesses seabed
contract rights in strategically important locations: east of Guam and southeast of the Hawaiian
Islands. If China moves to exploit resources in these areas, it could justify decisions to bolster
Chinese naval presence.79
China’s distant-ocean survey activities also serve political purposes. These functions are subsidiary
to the economic and military drivers discussed above. Still, their efforts to forge closer ties with other
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coastal states in the Indo-Pacific could create good will that Beijing can leverage in times and
circumstances where U.S. and Chinese interests collide. These interactions also allow China to
promote its views on the international maritime order, which differ markedly from those held in the
U.S.
This report addresses basic questions about China’s distant-ocean marine science. In doing so, it has
raised many new ones. Future work should closely examine specific civilian research projects. What
questions are Chinese scientists seeking to answer? Which oceanic phenomena are of greatest
interest? What instrument and techniques are they using to answer these questions? Follow-on
research should seek a far more detailed understanding of relationships between civilian research
institutes and the PLAN. What funding arrangements exist between the Chinese military and the
MNR, CAS, and the Qingdao National Lab? How are data and findings shared? How does the work
of civilian scientists and engineers get translated to the production of hardware, systems, and tactics
used by the PLAN? These questions, and many others, must be satisfactorily answered before we can
fully grasps the risks and challenges presented by Beijing’s growing interest in distant-ocean marine
science.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1. Key Members of China’s Distant-Ocean Research Fleet
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Figure 2. Chinese Survey Operations in the Western Pacific (October 2017)80
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Figure 3. The “Island Chains”
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Figure 4. The Location of China’s Contract Zones with the International Seabed Authority
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Figure 5. Company Brochure for the Sea Wing (showing operations in the Philippines EEZ)81
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Figure 6. Activities of China’s Distant-Ocean Research Fleet
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Figure 7. PLAN Distant-Ocean Survey Ship Haiyang 25
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